We quantify the contribution of the largest firms to South Korea's economic performance since 1970. Using firm-level historical data, we document a novel fact: firm concentration rose substantially during the growth miracle period. To understand whether the increased importance of large firms contributed positively or negatively to the South Korean growth miracle, we build a quantitative heterogeneous firm small open economy model. Our framework accommodates a variety of causes and consequences of (changes in) firm concentration: productivity, distortions, selection into exporting, and oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market power in domestic goods and labor markets. The model is implemented directly on the firm-level data and inverted to recover the drivers of changing concentration. We find that most of the increased concentration is attributable to higher productivity growth of the largest firms. Shutting down differential productivity growth of the top 3 firms within each sector would have decreased firm concentration, but nonetheless would have reduced welfare by 2%. Differential distortions and foreign market access of the largest firms played a more limited role in the trends in concentration and had a smaller welfare impact. Thus, the largest Korean firms were superstars rather than supervillains.

Should policymakers in developing countries prioritize foreign technology adoption over domestic innovation? How might this depend on development stages? Using historical technology transfer data from South Korea, we find that greater productivity gaps with foreign firms correlate with larger productivity growth after adoption, despite lower fees. Furthermore, non-adopters increased patent citations to foreign sellers, suggesting knowledge spillovers. Motivated by these findings, we build a two-country growth model with innovation and adoption. As the gaps narrow, productivity gains and spillovers from adoption diminish and foreign sellers strategically raise fees due to intensified competition, which renders adoption subsidies less effective. Korea’s shift from adoption to innovation subsidies substantially contributed to growth and welfare. We also explore the optimal policy and its interaction with import tariffs.

This paper develops an occupation-level measure of Capital-Embodied Innovation (CEI) by matching patents with capital goods based on their text similarity. The impact of CEI on labor demand is heterogeneous, depending on the similarity between capital and occupational tasks. Specifically, CEI associated with task-similar capital reduces the relative labor demand, whereas CEI related to task-dissimilar capital raises it. Between 1980 and 2015, capital used by high-wage occupations experienced more innovations in task-dissimilar capital and fewer in task-similar capital. CEI can explain 51% of the relative wage growth in high-wage occupations and significantly contributes to routine- and abstract-biased labor market changes.

We study how the adoption of foreign technology and local spillovers from such adoption contributed to late industrialization in a developing country during the postwar period. Using novel historical firm-level data for South Korea, we provide three empirical findings: direct productivity gains to adopters, local productivity spillovers of the adoption, and complementarity in firms' adoption decisions. Based on these findings, we develop a dynamic spatial model with firms' technology adoption decisions and local spillovers. The spillovers induce dynamic complementarity in firms' technology adoption decisions. Because of this complementarity, the model potentially features multiple steady states. Temporary adoption subsidies can have permanent effects by moving an economy to a new transition path that converges to a higher-productivity steady state. We calibrate our model to the microdata and econometric estimates. We evaluate the effects of the South Korean government policy that temporarily provided adoption subsidies to heavy manufacturing firms in the 1970s. Had no adoption subsidies been provided, South Korea would have converged to a less industrialized steady state in which the heavy manufacturing sector’s share of GDP would have been 15 percentage points lower and aggregate welfare would have been 10% lower compared to the steady state with successful industrialization. Thus, temporary subsidies for technology adoption had permanent effects.